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I. THE OVERVIEW
To heal the persisting wounds of historic injustice,' governments,
communities, and civil and human rights groups throughout the world are
shaping redress initiatives around some form of reconciliation. Many of the
initiatives are salutary.2 All are fraught with challenges.
In Asia, Japan reluctantly faces continuing demands from victims of its
World War II military atrocities. Following the abolition of racial apartheid in
South Africa, in order to rebuild the country, the new government-centered
Truth and Reconciliation Commission pursued reconciliation between those
perpetrating human rights violations and those badly harmed-a formal process
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1 Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Obrey, Reframing Redress: A "Social Healing Through
Justice" Approach to Native Hawaiian-United States and Indigenous Ainu-Japan
Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 (2009).
2 There are two prominent recent precursors to contemporary redress efforts. In Europe,
German, French, and Swiss banks paid reparations to Holocaust survivors and their heirs for
misappropriating assets of Jewish bank account holders during World War II. HOLOCAUST
RESTITUTION (Michael Bazyler & Rodger P. Alford eds., 2006). In the United States, the
President apologized to Japanese Americans wrongfully incarcerated during World War II, and
Congress conferred $20,000 in individual reparations and established a program of public
education. ERIc K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2d ed. forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors) [hereinafter
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION].
3 As recently as September 13, 2010, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada apologized
to former U.S. prisoners of war for their mistreatment and abuse at the hands of the Imperial
Army during World War II. See Masami Ito, Okada Apologizesfor U.S. POWs' Treatment, THE
JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20l009l4a3.html; Kristl K. Ishikane, Korean Sex Slaves' Unfinished Journey for
Justice: Reparations from the Japanese Government for the Institutionalized Enslavement and
Mass Military Rapes ofKorean Women During World War II, 29 U. HAW. L. REv. 123 (2005).
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of truth-telling, confessions, amnesty and reparation.4 Timor Leste's
Parliament organized a similar commissions to address the atrocities by
Indonesian soldiers during Indonesia's twenty-year occupation of East Timor,6
with a focus on the sexual violence against East Timor women.7 Indeed, in this
"Age of Reconciliation,"' initiatives proliferate across the globe. Formal
reconciliation projects mark the landscape in Peru,9 Colombia,'o Chile," El
Salvador,12 Argentina,13 Rwanda,14 Cambodia," and Sierra Leone.' 6 And on
4 See generally Penelope E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid's Victims: The Path to
Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 1155 (2004); Erin Daly, Reparations in South Africa: A
Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 367 (2003); Marianne Geula, South Africa's Truth
Reconciliation Commission as an Alternate Means of Addressing Transitional Government
Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57 (2000); Tama Koss, Comment, South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Model For the Future, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L.
517 (2002); Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despairfora New South Africa: The Limits ofRights
Discourse, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 63 (1997); Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan K. Serrano, Healing
Racial Wounds? The Final Report ofSouth Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in
WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 492 (Roy Brooks ed., 1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 4 (1997).
s The Commission is known as the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in
Timor-Leste or CAVR (the Portuguese acronym). Post-CA VR Technical Secretariat, CAVR,
www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
6 For a discussion of the reconciliation process in Timor Leste, formerly known as East
Timor, see generally Cheah Wui Ling, Forgiveness and Punishment in Post-Conflict Timor, 10
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 297 (2005).
7 See Galuh Wandita et al., Learning to Engender Reparations in Timor-Leste: Reaching
out to Female Victims, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN?: GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONs 284 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed., 2006).
8 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 32.
* See generally Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions,
Reparations, and the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141 (2007); Lisa J.
Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation
Policies in Peru's Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 51 (2007).
to In 2006, Colombia's National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR)
issued its Mission Statement explaining the goal of "healing the wounds" against the unique
challenges of carrying out "a policy of truth, justice, and reparation in the middle of the
conflict." National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation--CNRR, Mission Statement
(2006), available at http://www.cnrr.org.co/contenido/09ilspip.php?article7.
" Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 55, 56 (Pablo De Greiffed., 2006).
12 Alexander Segovia, The Reparations Proposals ofthe Truth Commissions in El Salvador
andHaiti: A History ofNoncompliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 11, at
154, 156.
13 Nunca Mis (Never Again): Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the
Disappearance of Persons) - 1984, available at
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/englishlibrary/nevagain/nevagain001 .htm.
14 Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
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foreign terrain, micro- or community-based reconciliation processes are gaining
traction.17
In the United States, too, the federal and state governments, as well as
various private organizations, are organizing reparatory justice efforts in a
variety of settings-efforts that extend beyond singular payments of monetary
compensation. African Americans are pursuing reparatory justice for slavery
and Jim Crow segregation through lawsuits and lobbying state and local
governments.' 8 Mexican Americans filed a class action lawsuit and are now
seeking legislative reparations and an apology from several states and the
federal government for their coercive "deportation" of thousands of Mexican
Americans and legal resident Mexican immigrants during the Great Depression
in order to open jobs for white workers.' 9 Japanese Latin Americans-
abducted by the United States during World War II and held hostage in U.S.
internment camps as bargaining chips with Japan-advocate for the same
Presidential apology and reparations payments received by former Japanese
239, 251 (2008).
15 David Cohen, "Hybrid" Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: "Lessons
Learned" and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (2007).
16 Id. at 11. For a discussion of other reconciliation initiatives, see PRISCILLA B. HAYNER,
UNSPEAKABLE TRuTHs (2011) (documenting forty truth commissions in operation from 1974 to
2009).
17 Following the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the government's Commission for
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation established separate "Community Reconciliation
Procedures" to enable villages to handle non-serious criminal and civil disputes. Patrick
Burgess, Community Reconciliation in East Timor: A Personal Perspective, in PATHWAYS TO
RECONCILIATION-BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 139, 143 (Philips Rothfield et al. eds.,
2008). A presiding panel from a village comprised of local leaders from churches, women's
groups, youth committees, and other groups heard testimony and, according to reconciliation
principles, shaped acknowledgements and apologies and facilitated agreements on reparations
payments and community service. Id. at 144. The community reconciliation process filled a
vacuum, "providing the only contact with any process ofjustice for most people." Id. at 147.
18 See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811 (2006); Eric
J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C.
THmRD WORLD L.J. 45 (2004); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the
Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Reparations for the Children of Slaves: Litigating the Issues, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 245
(2003); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. TmRW
WORLD L.J. 13 (2004); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider The Case
for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 429 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:
Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477 (1998).
19 Eric L. Ray, Mexican Repatriation and the Possibility for a Federal Cause ofAction: A
Comparative Analysis on Reparations, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 171, 171 (2005);
Wendy Koch, U.S. Urged to Apologize for 1930s Deportations, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-04-1930s-deportees-coverx.htm.
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American internees. 2 0 Filipino World War II veterans who fought for the
United States are seeking promised veterans' benefits some sixty-five years
later.2 1 Native HawaiianS22 and Native Americans-two indigenous groups
displaced from homelands, stripped of political power, and partially robbed of
cultural identity-seek to reclaim land, restore self-governance, and rebuild
23
culture through reconciliation initiatives with federal and state governments.
Private organizations are also engaged. The United Church of Christ Hawai'i
Conference and its national counterpart undertook a multi-faceted four-year
reconciliation process with Native Hawaiian churches and the larger Native
Hawaiian community for the denomination's participation in the overthrow of
the Hawaiian nation 100 years earlier.24
The stakes are high, both for those experiencing persisting harms and for
society itself.25 The wounds of injustice persist over time.2 6
First, the harms of serious discrimination and violence are not isolated abstract
ideas but are found in people's "lived experiences," grounded in their "everyday
lives." Second, those experiences are not only "very painful and stressful in the
immediate situation . . . but also have a cumulative impact on particular
individuals, their families, and their communities." The harms of injustice are
20 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: US. Disregard For International Law in
the World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275
(1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Reluctant Redress: The United States'Kidnapping andInternment
of Japanese Latin Americans, in MARTHA MINOw, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED:
MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR 132, 136 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2003).
21 Filipino-American WWII Vets Seek Equal Benefits, SF GATE, Feb. 21, 2011, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-02-21/news/28617677_1_filipino-american-veterans-filipino-
soldiers-speier; Oliver Teves, Philippine WWII Veterans Seek Equality From US, USA TODAY,
Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-24-
1315739951 x.htm
22 In this article, the term "Native Hawaiian" refers to "all persons descended from the
Polynesians who lived in the Hawaiian Islands when Captain James Cook arrived in 1778." See
JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI'I? 1 n.1 (2008). The term
"Kinaka Maoli" is also used to describe the indigenous people of Hawai'i. See id.
23 See S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law:
Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REV. 309 (1994); William C.
Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts ": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an
American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002-2003); Lorie M.
Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARv. HUM. RTs J.
47 (2008).
24 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL
RIGHTS AMERICA 61-71, 214-35 (1999) [hereinafter YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE].
25 See JOER. FEAGIN &MELVINP. SIKEs, LIVING WITH RACISM: THEBLACKMIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE 16 (1994) (describing findings on the ways deeply embedded discrimination
generates economic and psychological harms that carry across generations).
26 Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American Reparations
Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 40 (2007).
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"stored not only in individual memories but also in family stories and group
recollections" over time. 27
Indeed, experiences of injustice shape people's life perspectives. Those
experiences "generate a picture of a fundamentally unjust society, where hard
work and achieved status are inadequate protection against those with power
and privilege."28
Efforts to heal injustice present numerous challenges. Both domestically and
internationally, reconciliation initiatives encounter stubborn obstacles: political
opposition, economic recession, government foot-dragging, and internal group
dissension.29 Aggrieved people criticize government apologies when reparatory
action fails to follow words of contrition. Aborigines' anger at Australia's
refusal to consider reparations after the government's apology to the "stolen
generations" of children is but one example.o Indigenous peoples' frustration
at Canada's delayed implementation of its reconciliation initiative to redress the
forced assimilation of aboriginal children in abusive white residential schools is
another.3 1 Even reconciliation efforts that steadily progress face major
hurdles.3 2
More specifically, and the focal point of this article: After a lengthy process
that generates a multiparty reconciliation initiative, what happens when a
government's unilateral action on key aspects of the initiative threatens to
27 Id. at 40 (quoting FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 25, at 15-16). Professor Jonathan Osorio
describes the historic injustice to Native Hawaiians as "a story of violence, in which that
colonialism literally and figuratively dismembered the lhui (the people) from their traditions,
their lands, and ultimately their government. The mutilations were not physical only, but also
psychological and spiritual." JONATHAN KAY KAMAKAwIWO'OLE OSORlo, DISMEMBERING
LAHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIlAN NATION TO 1887, at 3 (2002).
28 Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, supra note 26, at 40.
29 See generally Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights
Violations: The Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights andBeyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 351 (2008); Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Mackintosh, Redress and the Salience ofEconomic
Justice, OXFORD FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY, no. 4 (2010).
30 See Tim Johnston, Australia Apologizing to Aborigines, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/world/asia/13iht-13aborigine-
copy.9995732.html. For a discussion of Australia's halting reconciliation initiative with its
indigenous population, see Barbara Ann Hocking & Margaret Stephenson, Why the Persistent
Absence of a Foundational Principle?: Indigenous Australians, Proprietary and Family
Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 477,477-522 (Federico Lenzerini ed.,
2008).
31 See Bradford W. Morse, Indigenous Peoples of Canada and Their Efforts to Achieve
True Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 30, at 271, 275-76.
See also Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy ofNative Residential School Abuse in
Canada: Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 253 (2002).
32 See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 29 (describing progress and obstacles in Peru's
and South Africa's reconciliation initiatives).
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undermine the government's reconciliation commitment? Is that simply
political reality? Or might courts of law enforce the underpinnings of that
commitment? Put another way: Is reconciliation merely new-age talk with no
legal effect? Or when a legislature and an executive branch commit to
reconciliation, will courts enforce key aspects of that commitment? The answer
to the latter question is yes . .. under certain circumstances.
This is why Chief Justice Ronald Moon's33 2008 opinion in Office of
Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of
Hawaii (OHA v. HCDCH)34 is path-forging. That unanimous opinion35
addresses what those circumstances might be and lays the groundwork for
possible future enforcement of integral aspects of reconciliation commitments,
including the State of Hawai'i's commitment to Native Hawaiians. In broader
view, the pronouncements of the Hawai'i Supreme Court (the Court)36 in OHA
v. HCDCH underscore a government's-any government's-accountability for
its public reconciliation promises.
Briefly stated, in OHA v. HCDCH, the State's high court cited the State's
commitment to reconciliation with Native Hawaiians as a primary reason for
imposing a freeze on the State's sale of former native lands now held in trust.3 7
For the first time, a court in the United States imposed major legal
38
consequences onto a government's reconciliation commitment. In essence,
the Hawai'i Supreme Court determined that the State cannot intone
"reconciliation" to garner good graces and then, when politically convenient,
undermine promised reparatory action. It identified the origins of the State's
commitment-including the Hawai'i Constitution, multiple acts by the Hawai'i
Legislature, and executive branch pronouncements-and cited these collective
laws and pronouncements as a primary legal basis for enjoining the State's sale
of trust lands until the State and Hawaiian peoples' representatives resolve
Hawaiians' "unrelinquished claims" to those lands.39 The Court's injunction
33 Chief Justice Moon served as Chief Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court from 1993
until he retired in August 2010. The current Chief Justice Mark Recktenwald succeeded Chief
Justice Moon as head of the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
34 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw. 174,
177 P.3d 884 (2008), rev'd sub nom. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436
(2009).
3 Justice Steven Levinson, Justice Paula Nakayama, Justice Simeon Acoba, and Circuit
Court Judge Derrick Chan (in place of Justice James Duffy) joined in the opinion.
36 This article's usage of "Court" with a capital "C" as a short-hand reference to the Hawai'i
Supreme Court is meant to elevate the state high court and the path-forging significance of its
ruling for local, national, and international audiences. The few references to the U.S. Supreme
Court in this article are clearly designated as such.
3 See OHA, 117 Haw. at 192, 177 P.3d at 902.
38 Research on Lexis and Westlaw revealed no other federal or state court decision.
' See infra Part IV.B.2. This part of the article draws from Brief for Equal Justice Society
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did not settle these political claims. Rather, it preserved the object at the heart
of one of those claims for political negotiations.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court grounded its decision in state and federal law,
citing both the 1993 Congressional Apology Resolution (Apology Resolution)4 0
and related state legislation. 4 1 Although the U.S. Supreme Court later reversed
and vacated the Hawai'i court's ruling because of its reliance on federal law,42
the U.S. Supreme Court left open the question of whether there were adequate
state law grounds to enforce the State's reconciliation commitment.4 As
intimated in Chief Justice Moon's opinion, and as we elaborate below,
independent and adequate state law grounds do support the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's initial ruling." The State, through its three branches of government
and its voting citizenry, acknowledged the historic injustice and committed the
State to reparatory justice through reconciliation,45 including political
negotiations over the return of ceded lands. The U.S. Supreme Court's
reversal, therefore, does not undercut the import of the Moon opinion: a state's
own commitment to reconciliation to redress the persistent harms of injustice
creates, in some situations, legally enforceable obligations.
This is why the Hawai'i Supreme Court's opinion in OHA v. HCDCH is
broadly significant-the opinion provides a conceptual and legal framework for
those involved in redress initiatives in Hawai'i, the continental United States,
and beyond. This is especially important given the reconciliation concept's
ubiquity, elasticity, and susceptibility to shifting political and economic
forces.46
To assist in our assessment of the OHA v. HCDCH opinion, we draw upon
an analytical approach to reconciliation initiatives. That approach, developed
by Professor Yamamoto, is Social Healing Through Justice.47 It identifies
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct.
1436 (2009) (No. 07-1372), 2009 WL 247667.
40 Joint Resolution To Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893
Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to Offer an Apology to Native Hawaiians on Behalf
of the United States for the Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107
Stat. 1510 (1993) [hereinafter Apology Resolution].
41 See OHA, 117 Haw. at 195, 177 P.3d at 905.
42 Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).
43 Id. at 1445.
4 See infra Part IV.B.2.
45 See infra Part IV.B.2.
46 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 30-37.
47 This approach first emerged in Professor Yamamoto's book on interracial justice, which
focused in part on a multidisciplinary approach to redressing historic injustice. See YAMAMOTO,
INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24. This framework was updated and refined in two
subsequent articles. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, supra note 26; Yamamoto & Obrey, supra
note 1. Other scholars have advanced theories of reparations. See, e.g., TAKING WRONGS
SERIOUSLY: APOLOGIES AND RECONCILIATION (Elazar Barkan & Alexander Karn eds., 2006);
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social healing as the deeper aim of most redress efforts in established
democracies, 48 links words of healing to reparatory acts, and elaborates upon
both the substance and process of reconciliation. The approach engages a
redress framework embracing the "Four Rs" of Social Healing Through
Justice: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and reparation. These
Four Rs offer guides for both shaping and later assessing reconciliation
initiatives. 49
For this shaping and assessing, historical context matters. To provide that
context for Chief Justice Moon's OHA v. HCDCH opinion, Part II of this
article briefly describes the historical background for the litigation and court
ruling. Part III analyzes the opinion itself, highlights the Hawai'i Supreme
Court's identification of the State's commitment to reconciliation with Native
Hawaiians, and explains events following the Court's decision. With Social
Healing Through Justice in mind, Part IV examines the broader impact of the
decision for reparatory initiatives here and abroad.
II. THE SETTING
A. Hawai'i's Indigenous People50
The State's commitment to reconciliation is rooted in Native Hawaiians'
special connection to Hawaiian lands." After King Kamehameha unified the
Roy L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS
(2006); ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO AND CON (2006); JOHN DAWSON, HEALING
AMERICA'S WOUNDS (1994); NICHOLAS TAvuCIs, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION (1993); POLITICS AND THE PAST (John Torpey ed., 2003). See also AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000); Martha C. Nussbaum, Symposium, Capabilities and
Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L REV. 273 (1997); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Rights and
Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 21 (2007). For a more detailed discussion of
reparations theory and practice, see Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, supra note 26, at 15-39.
48 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 27.
49 Id. at 33.
5o This section provides a brief overview of the historical events that generated the impetus
for reconciliation with Native Hawaiians. For more complete discussions, see ToM COFFMAN,
NATION WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAI'I (1998);
MICHAEL DOUGHERTY, To STEAL A KINGDOM: PROBING HAWAIIAN HISTORY (1992); LILIKALA
KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PoNo AI? (1992); OsoRIo,
supra note 27; NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO
AMERICAN COLONIALISM (2004); and HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER:
COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAl'I (1999).
51 Professor Lilikali Kame'eleihiwa provided a succinct history of Native Hawaiians'
special connection to the land to the Hawaii Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights:
From time immemorial, Native Hawaiians have had a special genealogical relationship to
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islands, Native Hawaiians thrived on a unique communal land tenure system, a
self-sustaining economy, a stable political order, and a sophisticated language,
culture, and religion. 52  The Hawaiian principle of "caring for the land"
organized and guided Hawaiian society.53 At the time of English Captain
Cook's contact with Hawai'i in 1778, the Native Hawaiian population
flourished at around 800,000.'1
Western contact triggered changes that permanently scarred this indigenous
landscape. Foreign diseases decimated the Native Hawaiian population.
Missionaries catalyzed the demise of traditional religion.55  American
businessmen pushed for the adoption of Western laws in ways that advanced
their economic interests. 56 Internationally, Britain, France, and the United
States valued Hawai'i for its strategic military locale.s? King Kamehameha III
addressed the threat of a foreign power takeover and the loss of Hawaiian land
in part through the transformation of the Hawaiian Kingdom into a
constitutional monarchy in 1840.
the Hawaiian islands. Born from the mating of Earth Mother Papa and Sky Father
Wlkea, we're the Hawaiian islands the Hawaiian people. That's the definition of native.
We are from the land 100 generations ago. As such we have an ancient duty to love,
cherish, and cultivate our beloved grandmother, the land. The study of stewardship is
called milama 'dina, where land is not for buying and selling, but for the privilege of
living upon. And in the reciprocal relationship, when we Native Hawaiians care for and
cultivate the land, she feeds and protects us.
Haw. Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Reconciliation at a Crossroads:
The Implications of the Apology Resolution and Rice v. Cayetano for Federal and State
Programs Benefiting Native Hawaiians 27 (2001), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/hi0601/hawaii.pdf [hereinafter Hawaii Advisory Committee]
(quoting Dr. Lilikala Kame'elehiwa, Statement Before the Hawai'i Advisory Committee to the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: The Impact of the Decision in Rice v. Cayetano on
Entitlements 29-30 (Sept. 29, 2000) (transcript)).
52 Apology Resolution, supra note 40, 107 Stat. 1510. For a discussion of the traditional
land tenure system, see Melody K. MacKenzie, Historical Background, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN
RIGHTs HANDBOOK 3, 3-6 (Melody K. MacKenzie ed., 1991) [hereinafter MacKenzie, Historical
Background]; Davianna McGregor, An Introduction to the Hoa'iina and Their Rights, 1
HAWAIIAN J. HiST. 30 (1996); and VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 11-18.
5 See generally DAVIANNA PoMAIKA'I McGREGOR, NA KUA'AINA: LIVING HAWAIIAN
CULTURE (2007); see also Mililani B. Trask, Historical and Contemporary Hawaiian-Self
Determination: A Native Hawaiian Perspective, 8 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 77, 78 (1991).
54 See KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 50, at 20.
5 See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 21-22.
56 MacKenzie, Historical Background, supra note 52, at 5-6 (describing the transition from
the traditional Hawaiian land tenure system to one based on Western concepts of property law);
see also NOEL J. KENT, HAWAI'I: ISLANDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE (1993).
57 VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 30.
58 Id.
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The King agreed to laws that he believed would secure Native Hawaiian
control over much of Hawai'i's land in the event of a foreign invasion.5 9 The
1848 Mhele (division) began the conversion of Hawai'i's indigenous
communal land tenure system to a Western fee simple system for the express
purpose of creating indigenous Hawaiian land ownership.60 Three classes of
individuals were entitled to land awards: the M6'1 (king), the Ali'i (chiefs) and
the maka'dinana (native tenants).6' Kamehameha III divided the land he
received into two parts-one part he retained for himself, which later became
the Crown Lands; the other part he set aside as Government Lands for the
benefit of his Kingdom's people.62 Despite Kamehameha III's reservations
about foreign landowners, American and former American businessmen later
pressured the King to allow Westerners to acquire fee title. For a variety of
economic and political reasons, within fifty years of the Mhele, former
American missionaries and American-related businesses gained control over
most of Hawai'i's non-Crown and non-Government Lands.63
The calculated efforts of Westerners to control the Hawaiian Islands also
permeated the political sphere. Businessmen pushed King Kalakaua and the
U.S. Congress to execute the 1875 Reciprocity Treaty that gave the United
States military control over Pearl Harbor in exchange for eliminating U.S.
tariffs on Hawai'i sugar and pineapple.6 The Hawaiian League, a group of
non-Hawaiian businessmen, then pressured Kalikaua into signing what is now
called the "Bayonet Constitution."65 The new constitution transferred much of
the King's authority to these businessmen and disenfranchised the Hawaiian
people. Upon succeeding to the throne, Queen Lili'uokalani planned to
scuttle the new constitution and return control to the monarchy.
s9 See JON J. CHINEN, THE GREATMAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVIsIoN OF 1848, at 25 (1958)
("The king was deeply concerned over the hostile activities of the foreigners in the Islands. He
did not want his lands to be considered public domain and subject to confiscation by a foreign
power in the event of a conquest.").
60 See generally KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 50 (describing the 1848 Mahele and the
transformation of the communal land system to a privatized one). See also GAVAN DAWS,
SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 126 (1974). The King consented to the
original Mdhele conditioned upon the exclusion of foreign land ownership. Id.
61 See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 40.
62 See id. at 50-51.
63 See MacKenzie, Historical Background, supra note 52, at 9-10; KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra
note 50, at 298-306; VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 51.
64 See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIVE HAWAIIANS: FROM MAUKA TO MAKAI: THE
RIVER OF JUSTICE MUST FLOW FREELY 23 (2000) (quoting H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. I at 39-41
(1894)).
65 See OSORIO, supra note 27, at 238-41.
66 See id. at 238-49; Trask, supra note 53, at 79; VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 145-49.
67 See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 151.
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In 1893, however, backed by the U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, a
68
small group of American and former American businessmen, calling
themselves the "Committee of Safety,"69 overthrew the sovereign Hawaiian
nation. 70 The ensuing provisional government established the Republic of
Hawai'i in 1894, and the Republic claimed title to all Government and Crown
Lands. 1  A contentious debate over U.S. annexation erupted. Then-U.S.
President Grover Cleveland described the American-supported coup as "an Act
of War" against an intemationally-recognized sovereign and supported
72
restoration of the Hawaiian nation.
In 1896, newly-elected President William McKinley reversed course. As
part of its colonial expansion in the Pacific in 1898, the United States annexed
Hawai'i.73 The annexation occurred "without the consent of or compensation
to the indigenous people of Hawaii or their sovereign government who were
thereby denied ... their lands and ocean resources." 74 The Republic "ceded"
the 1.75 million acres of former Government and Crown Lands to the United
States. Against the vehement protests of the former Queen and most of her
constituents, the United States acquired Hawai'i as a territory.
Sixty years of near-absolute Western control over Hawai'i's economy,
politics, and social life ensued. The white "oligarchy," 7 7 with support from
Congress, the military, and presidential appointments, controlled the lands, the
68 COFFMAN, supra note 50; VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 162.
69 See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 64, at 26-27.
70 See, e.g., MacKenzie, Historical Background, supra note 52, at 10-12; VAN DYKE, supra
note 22, at 151-71.
71 MacKenzie, Historical Background, supra note 52, at 13. Queen Lili'uokalani was
forced to abdicate her throne after the Republic of Hawai'i established itself Id. While
imprisoned in her own palace, the Queen lamented, "[i]t had not entered our hearts to believe
that these friends and allies from the United States . . . would ever ... seize our nation by the
throat, and pass it over to an alien power." LILI'UOKALANI, HAWAII'S STORY BY HAWAII'S
QUEEN 368 (1898).
72 GROVER CLEVELAND, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE RELATING TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, H.R.
EXEC. Doc. No. 47, at VI (1893).
7 For a discussion of the historical events leading up to Hawai'i's annexation, see
COFFMAN, supra note 50. .
74 42 U.S.C. § 11701(11) (2006). The vehicle of a Joint Resolution was apparently an
invalid means of annexation. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring a treaty and vote of
Congress for annexation). Some therefore argue that Hawaiian sovereignty has never
extinguished, and the United States is an occupying force. David Keanu Sai, The American
Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom: Beginning the Transition from Occupied to Restored
State (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i) (on file with authors).
7s VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 213.
76 See SILVA, supra note 50, at 123-130.
77 See FRANCINE DU PLESSIx GRAY, HAWAii: THE SUGAR-COATED FORTRESS (1972)
(describing the oligarchy that controlled Hawai'i for the first half of the century).
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economy, the ethnic make-up, and the politics of the islands. 8 The United
States' colonization of Hawai'i tore at the fabric of Native Hawaiian life.79
Indeed, by 1920, in creating the Hawaiian Homelands Program,o Congress
designated Native Hawaiians "a dying race."
The international trend toward decolonization 8 2 and the Democratic
revolution in Hawai'i in the mid-20th century brought further change to the
islands.
The unionization of plantation and dockworkers and the return of Japanese
Americans from World War II energized a growing Hawai'i Democratic Party.
With an expanded Asian American political presence, the invigorated
Democratic Party legislatively unseated the white Republican oligarchy that had
controlled politics and the economy for sixty years. Democrats and Republicans,
along with some Native Hawaiians, then pushed for statehood.83
The 1959 State Admission Act transferred a majority of ceded lands8 4-1.4
million acres of the 1.75 million acres-from the federal government to the
State of Hawai'i in trust,85 in part for "the betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians."86
7 See id.
7 See generally OsoRIO, supra note 27. For statistics on Native Hawaiians' socio-
economic status today, see Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 51, at 12-18.
so Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
8 H.R. REP. No. 66-839, at 2 (1920).
82 The U.N. Charter in 1945 brought the principles of "equal rights and self-determination
of peoples" to the forefront of international discourse. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. General
Assembly Resolution 1514, voted in favor by eighty-nine states and none against in 1960,
stressed that "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in ... Non-Self-Governing Territories . .. to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories . . . in accordance with their freely
expressed will and desire. . . in order for them to enjoy complete independence and freedom."
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514 (XV), 5, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 at 66 (Dec. 14,
1960). Hawai'i had been on the United Nations' list of colonized territories eligible for
independence until statehood. Despite the United Nations' preference for non-self-governing
territories becoming independent, the plebiscite denied Hawaiians the option of voting for
independence.
83 YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 2; see generally
LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAn PONo: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1984); LAwRENCE H. FUCHs, HAWAII
PoNo: AN ETHNIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY (1997).
84 Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
85 VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 257-58.
86 Hawaii Admission Act, § 5(f), 73 Stat. at 5.
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B. The Commitment to Reconciliation
From African American civil rights movements and indigenous peoples'
human rights movements worldwide emerged a Hawaiian cultural renaissance
and intense grassroots political organizing for the restoration of sovereignty and
return of homelands. After years of education and agitation and with the
support of key religious and political leaders,87 the United States finally
acknowledged the harms of American colonization. The extraordinary 1993
Apology Resolution" apologized for the United States' participation in the
1893 "illegal overthrow"8 9 of the Hawaiian nation and committed the United
States to reconciliation to repair the resulting devastation.90
In the Apology Resolution, Congress acknowledged that the Republic of
Hawai'i ceded lands belonging to the Kingdom of Hawai'i "without the
consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people . . . or their
sovereign government" 91 and that "the indigenous Hawaiian people never
directly relinquished their claims . . . over their national lands to the United
States." 92 Congress further acknowledged that "the health and well-being of
the Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and
attachment to the land."93  Congress then expressed its "commitment to
acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow .. . in order to provide a proper
foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native
Hawaiian people." 94 Paralleling Congress' actions, the State of Hawai'i
endorsed what amounted to a reconciliation initiative that spanned all three
branches of government and its voting populace.
87 President William Clinton signed the Apology Resolution into law in November 1993.
Apology Resolution, supra note 40, 107 Stat. 1510.
8s Id.
89 Id. "whereas" cl. 19, 107 Stat. at 1512.
90 Id. § 1, 107 Stat. at 1513.
9 Id. "whereas" cl. 25, 107 Stat. at 1512.
92 Id. "whereas" cl. 29, 107 Stat. at 1512.
9 Id. "whereas" cl. 32, 107 Stat. at 1512.
94 Id. § 1, 107 Stat. at 1513 (emphasis added).
9 See infra Parts III.A, IV.B.2.a.
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C. The Litigation96
In 1994, the Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HFDC) and
the State initiated the transfer of two parcels of ceded lands to private
developers for residential housing.97 This marked the first proposed transfer of
ceded lands after the 1993 Apology Resolution and similar state legislation."
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)99 intervened in the sale and demanded a
disclaimer from HFDC that preserved any future Hawaiian government claims
to the ceded lands.' 00 HFDC refused.' 0' 
OHA then filed suit against HFDC (later renamed the Housing and
Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i (HCDCH)), 0 2 its board
members, and the Governor to stop the transfer. Thereafter, Pia Thomas Aluli,
Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, Charles Ka'ai'ai and Keoki Maka Kamaka
Ki'ili also filed suit, and the state circuit court consolidated the two lawsuits.'03
Collectively, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from selling the two
specific parcels of ceded lands and any other ceded lands.'0
The circuit court's opinion acknowledged the factual and historical bases for
Native Hawaiian claims to ceded lands, as described earlier, but ultimately
denied the request for injunctive relief. The court determined that jurisdictional
and other defenses-including sovereign immunity, waiver and estoppel, and
96 This section is drawn substantially from an essay by Moanike'ala Crowell, published in
the Ka He'e Summer 2008 newsletter of the Ka Huh Ao Center for Excellence in Native
Hawaiian Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i. See Moanike'ala
Crowell, Ho'oholo I Mua-Towards Reconciliation? Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. Housing
and Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i, KA HE'E (Ka Huli Ao Ctr. for
Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law, William S. Richardson Sch. of Law, Univ. of Haw.),
Summer 2008, available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/-nhlawctr/article5-4.htm.
9 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw. 174,
180, 177 P.3d 884, 890 (2008).
9 See id. at 187, 177 P.3d at 897.
9 For a discussion of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), see infra Part IV.B.2.a.
'oo OHA, 117 Haw. at 187, 177 P.3d at 897.
101 The Court explained that "HFDC declined to honor OHA's requested disclaimer because
'to do so would place a cloud on [the] title, rendering title insurance unavailable to buyers in the
Leali'i [sic] project."' Id. (internal citations omitted in original).
102 "In 1997, the legislature consolidated HFDC with the Hawai'i Housing Authority and the
rental housing trust fund into the Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii
(HCDCH)." Id. at 187 n.9, 177 P.3d at 897 n.9.
103 See id. at 188 n.12, 177 P.3d at 898 n.12.
' Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought either a declaration that the defendants were not
permitted to sell or transfer ceded lands from the public land trust or, if the defendants
prevailed, a declaration that transferring or selling ceded lands would not limit future claims by
Native Hawaiians to those lands. Id. at 188, 177 P.3d at 898.
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justiciability-barred the plaintiffs' claims.'os The court also concluded that
the State possessed the express authority to alienate ceded lands under the
Admission Act, the Hawai'i State Constitution, and state legislation.'0 6 It
adopted the reasoning of Attorney General Opinion 95-3107 that "[t]he
Admission Act § 5(f) expressly acknowledges that ceded or public lands may
be alienated when it refers to 'the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of
such lands."los From this executive branch opinion and the state constitutional
provisions and ordinary trust law principles,109 the court essentially determined
that as long as the State used the proceeds from the disposition of ceded lands
to further Native Hawaiian interests, one of the 5(f) trust purposes, the State
would not breach its trust obligation." 0
III. THE HAWAI'I SUPREME COURT AND A TIME OF RECKONING
A. The Court's 2008 OHA v. HCDCH Opinion
The Hawai'i Supreme Court vacated the circuit court judgment and
remanded."' A unanimous Court determined that neither the cited statutory
language nor ordinary property and trust law principles governed, and it ruled
in favor of OHA and the four individual plaintiffs." 2 Chief Justice Moon's
opinion for the Court recognized the historical basis for the plaintiffs' claims,
citing to the U.S. Apology Resolution and state laws, and determined that the
commitment to reconciliation with Native Hawaiians prevented the State from
doing what it could otherwise legally do-sell trust lands for fair value and pay
proceeds into the trust.
The Court found governmental commitments to reconciliation in both federal
and state law. The Court construed the federal 1993 Apology Resolution to be
more than a policy statement. In the Court's view, "Congress has clearly
recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the
ceded lands, which were taken without consent or compensation and which the
10 Id. at 189, 177 P.3d at 899 (referencing opinion by then-Circuit Court Judge Sabrina
McKenna).
106 See Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., Civ. No. 94-0-
4207, slip op. at 89 (Haw. 1st Cir. Dec. 5, 2002).
107 Id. at 82.
1os Id. at 84 (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. 95-3 (1995)).
09 Id. at 89.
"1 Id. at 92-94.
"' Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw. 174,
218, 177 P.3d 884, 928 (2008), rev'dsub nom. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S.Ct.
1439 (2009).
112 The Hawai'i Supreme Court also disposed of each procedural and jurisdictional issue.
See id. at 197-211, 177 P.3d at 907-21.
517
University ofHawai'i Law Review / Vol. 33:503
native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to
future generations."' 13 The Court determined that the Apology Resolution did
not itself require the State to restore the ceded lands to Native Hawaiians.114
Rather, it contemplated a process of reconciliation between Native Hawaiians
and the federal and state governments that encompassed those land claims.'
As the Court highlighted, the Apology Resolution "serves as the foundation (or
starting point) for reconciliation, including the future settlement of the
plaintiffs' unrelinquished [land] claims.""'6
The Court bolstered its conclusion through an assessment of state law. It
acknowledged that Hawai'i's people "clarified the State's trust obligation to
native Hawaiians""' 7 through ratification of the 1978 constitutional amendment
that created OHA. As elaborated later in this article,"'8 OHA's creation marked
an important milestone for Native Hawaiian claims to self-governance and land
restoration. Hawai'i's populace through its constitution had established a
vehicle for reparatory action that for the first time "provide[d] for
accountability, self-determination, [and] methods for self-sufficiency through
assets and a land base."" 9
The Court also scrutinized related state legislation that echoed the federal
Apology Resolution. As detailed later, according to the Court, the analogous
state acts gave rise to the State's fiduciary duty to preserve the ceded lands
pending political resolution of Native Hawaiian land claims.120 The Court
explained that "such duty is consistent with the State's obligation to use
reasonable skill and care in managing the public lands trust" and that the
State's conduct should be judged "by the most exacting fiduciary standards."'21
Specifically, the Court pointed to Act 354 in which the Hawai'i Legislature
acknowledged that many Native Hawaiians and others view the 1893 overthrow
to have been an illegal act by the United States.' 22 Act 354 also contemplated
some form of land reparation-"many native Hawaiians believe that the lands
taken without their consent should be returned and if not, monetary
reparations made, and that they should have the right to sovereignty, or the
right to self-determination and self-government as do other native American
" Id. at 191, 177 P.3d at 901.
114 Id. at 192, 177 P.3d at 902.
"15 Id.
116 Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 182, 177 P.3d at 892.
11 See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
"9 STANDING COMM. REP. No. 59, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 644 (1980).
120 OHA, 117 Haw. at 193, 177 P.3d at 903.
121 Id. at 195, 177 P.3d at 905 (quoting Ahunav. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw.
327, 338, 640 P.2d 1161, 1169 (1982)).
122 Id. at 193, 177 P.3d at 903.
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peoples."l 23 Additionally, Act 354 recognized the Legislature's "continued
support to the native Hawaiian community by taking steps to promote the
restoration of the rights and dignity of native Hawaiians."l24 The Court also
found that in Act 359, the Legislature made findings similar to those expressed
in the Apology Resolution. That legislation, entitled "A Bill for an Act
Relating to Hawaiian Sovereignty," acknowledged that "the indigenous people
of Hawai'i were denied .. . their lands."1 2 5
Linking Native Hawaiian land claims to "lasting reconciliation," the Court
quoted from Act 329. That Act clarified responsibility for management of
public trust lands and observed that "lasting reconciliation so desired by all
people of Hawai'i is possible only if it fairly acknowledges the past while
moving into Hawaii's future." 2 6 Equally significant, Act 340 acknowledged
that "the island of Kaho'olawe is of significant cultural and historic importance
to the native people of Hawai'i" and required that Kaho'olawe be held in trust
and transferred to a sovereign Native Hawaiian entity in the future.12 7
With these laws in mind, the Hawai'i Supreme Court determined that the
consolidated plaintiffs met the three-prong test for a permanent injunction.128
The plaintiffs' legal claim was meritorious; the State's sale of ceded lands
during the reconciliation process would irreparably harm Native Hawaiians,
and the larger public interest in reconciliation supported the ban on the sale.12 9
The Court therefore held that the State possessed a fiduciary duty to preserve
the ceded lands as an integral part of the reconciliation process. In sum, the
Court highlighted:
(1) the cultural importance of the land to native Hawaiians, (2) that the ceded
lands were illegally taken from the native Hawaiian monarchy, (3) that future
reconciliation between the state and the native Hawaiian people is contemplated,
and, (4) once any ceded lands are alienated from the public lands trust, they will
be gone forever.' 30
123 Id. (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).
124 Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 354, § 1, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999, 999-1000)
(emphasis added).
125 Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 359, § 1, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, 1010).
126 Id. at 194, 177 P.3d at 904 (emphasis in original) (quoting Act of July 1, 1997, No. 329,
§ 1, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 956, 956).
127 Id. (quoting Act of June 30, 1993, No. 340, § 1, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 803, 803).
128 The court determined that the appropriate test for a permanent injunction is: "(1) whether
the plaintiff has prevailed on the merits; (2) whether the balance of irreparable damage favors
the issuance of a permanent injunction; and (3) whether the public interest supports granting
such an injunction." Id. at 212, 177 P.3d at 922.
129 Id. at 218, 177 P.3d at 928.
"30 Id. at 213, 177 P.3d at 923 (emphasis added).
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In particular, the Court emphasized that OHA and the Hawaiian claimants
would suffer irreparable damage without injunctive relief-ceded lands would
be "gone forever."' 3 1 Monetary payments in lieu of the ceded lands would not
suffice because of the intimate cultural and spiritual bond between Native
Hawaiians and those lands.132
The Court also determined that an injunction would serve the public's
interest in reconciliation, enabling the populace to "fairly acknowledge[] the
past while moving into Hawaii's future."' 33 The Court ended its opinion by
quoting the Hawai'i Legislature-"lasting reconciliation [is] desired by all
people of Hawaii."l34
B. An Epilogue
Proponents of Native Hawaiian rights lauded the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
unanimous decision. Celebration soon abated when then-Governor Linda
Lingle's administration petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari and the Court accepted review. After noting jurisdiction,' 5 the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the 1993 U.S. Apology Resolution
itself did not provide a legal basis for enjoining the State from alienating ceded
lands.136 The Court, however, acknowledged that it did not have jurisdiction to
3' Id.
132 Id. at 214-17, 177 P.3d at 924-27.
"3 Act of June 30, 1997, No. 329, § 1, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 956, 956.
134 OHA, 117 Haw. at 216, 177 P.3d at 926 (quoting Act of June 30, 1997, No. 329, § 1).
us Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436, 1442-43 (2009). OHA and the
other private plaintiffs in the suit argued that the case did not raise a federal question because
the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision rested on state law and urged the U.S. Supreme Court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1442. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that it has
jurisdiction whenever "a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion." Id. at 1442 (quoting Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)).
136 Id. at 1445. The U.S. Supreme Court examined whether "the Apology Resolution strips
Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer the lands that the United States
held in absolute fee and granted to the State of Hawaii, effective upon its admission into the
Union." Id. at 1443 (internal citations and alteration marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court
examined the two substantive provisions of the Apology Resolution and concluded that they
functioned as conciliatory statements. Id. at 1443-44. Turning its attention to the "whereas"
clauses that preface the Apology Resolution, the Court rejected the Hawai'i Supreme Court's
conclusion that they conclusively established Congress's recognition that the Native Hawaiian
people have unrelinquished claims over ceded lands. Id. at 1444-45. Accordingly, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the substantive provisions and "whereas" clauses of the Apology
Resolution as a matter of federal law did not strip the State of its sovereign authority to alienate
ceded lands. Id. at 1445.
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decide whether an adequate state law basis existed to enjoin the State from
selling ceded lands.137 The U.S. Supreme Court explained that it has "no
authority to decide questions of Hawaiian [i.e., state] law or to provide redress
for past wrongs except as provided for by federal law." 38
After the U.S. Supreme Court decision, OHA, all but one of the private
plaintiffs,13 9 and the State of Hawai'i settled their contentious dispute.14 0 Those
parties agreed to dismiss the lawsuit without prejudice conditioned on the
passage of special legislation1 4 1 requiring a two-thirds majority vote by both
legislative chambers before ceded lands could be sold or transferred.142 The
settlement agreement became effective when the 2009 Legislature passed
Senate Bill 1677 and Governor Lingle signed it into law as Act 176.143
All parties, except plaintiff Jonathan Osorio, thereafter filed a joint motion
seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal without prejudice, and the Hawai'i
Supreme Court granted the motion. 14 The State also filed a motion to dismiss
Osorio's appeal.145 The Court held that Osorio had standing to sue and pursue
an appeal but that his asserted claims were no longer "ripe" for adjudication
because the Legislature, under Act 176, had not approved the sale of any ceded
lands. 146 The fifteen-year legal dispute came to a close. OHA Chair Haunani
Apoliona and Attorney General Mark Bennett expressed in a joint statement
that "[w]e can now concentrate on working together on matters we all believe
are crucially important to Hawaii." 4 7
Yet, even with the legislation, many difficulties lay ahead for participants to
the State-Hawaiian reconciliation initiative.
137 Id. at 1445.
138 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter remanded the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with its opinion. Id.
13 Plaintiff Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio did not join the settlement agreement.
Settlement Agreement, Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 117
Haw. 174, 177 P.3d 884 (2008).
140 id.
141 The parties conditioned the settlement upon passage of S.B. No. 1677. Id.
142 Id.
143 Act of July 13, 2009, No. 176, 2009 Haw. Sess. Laws 705.
14 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 121 Haw. 324, 327
n.1, 219 P.3d 1111, 1114 n.1 (2009).
145 Id. at 326, 219 P.3d at 1113.
146 Id. at 339, 219 P.3d at 1126.
147 Gordon Y.K. Pang, State, OHA, 3 Plaintiffs Settle Ceded Lands Suit, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, May 6, 2009, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2009/May/06/ln/hawaii905060377.html.
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IV. A LIMITED BUT SIGNIFICANT JUDICIAL ROLE IN THE
RECONCILIATION PROCESS
A. A Social Healing Through Justice Approach to
Reconciliation Initiatives
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's OHA v. HCDCH decision revealed the
Court's clear-eyed grasp of the historic injustice and the centrality of ceded
lands to the reconciliation process. But how do we assess the judiciary's role in
the reconciliation process, particularly for Native Hawaiians and the people of
Hawai'i, as well as for other reconciliation initiatives in the United States and
beyond?
As mentioned, the Social Healing Through Justice framework is one
approach for guiding and critiquing reconciliation initiatives. 14 8 It draws upon
aspects of prophetic theology, social psychology, sociolegal studies, political
theory, economics, indigenous healing practices, 149 and law.1so From these
diverse disciplines, the approach identifies four commonalities that inform the
dynamics of the kind of justice that fosters healing for both harmed individuals
and society itself.15'
The first is the embrace of the equivalent of the South African social idea of
"ubuntu": all are members of the polity, and injury to one harms the entire
community; therefore healing the injured is the responsibility of all. The second
is that repair must occur in two realms simultaneously-the individual (micro)
and the institutional (macro). Participation in the process must be widespread,
and all must see a benefit. The third commonality is that there must be material
change in the socioeconomic conditions underlying reconstructed group
relationships--otherwise, the dangers of "empty apologies," "all words and no
action," "false grace," or a "failure of reconciliation.
Distilling these insights, the fourth commonality is reflected in a redress
framework that accounts for integral stages of or dimensions to genuine
reconciliation. This redress framework encompasses the "Four Rs" of Social
141 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 172-209; Yamamoto & Obrey,
supra note 1, at 28-37.
149 One of the indigenous healing practices drawn upon is ho'oponopono. See E. VICTORIA
SHOOK, Ho'oPONOPoNO: CONTEMPORARY USES OF A HAWAIIAN PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
(1985).
150 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 154-67 (discussing in depth these
disciplines' insights on group healing).
151 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 33.
152 Id at 32 (internal citations omitted).
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Healing Through Justice: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and
reparations.5 3
The first R, recognition, encompasses acknowledgement of persisting
socioeconomic and psychological injuries.154 It involves understanding how
individuals, because of their group identity, continue to suffer pain, anger,
shame, or material deprivation from historical injustice.'s The recognition
dimension also involves sociolegal inquiry. It prompts everyone to scrutinize
the historical roots for the present-day conflicts and to decode stock stories
embodying cultural stereotypes that seemingly legitimated the injustice. 56
Finally, the recognition dimension examines institutional barriers to egalitarian
relationships-the organizational structures that embody discriminatory policies
or denials of self-determination. 57
The next R, responsibility, entails an assessment of wrongdoing and the
acceptance of responsibility for resulting harms.15 The inquiry examines the
ways in which those with power over the aggrieved group may have abused
their power and excluded others from full participation in the polity." 9 An
acceptance of responsibility for healing is not limited to those who directly
inflicted the harm, but may extend to others who were complicit in or who
benefitted from the subjugation-all with an eye toward repairing the damage
and building the community anew.16o
The recognition of grievances and acceptance of responsibility for initiating
the reparatory process are key starting points. But something more is needed to
heal deep-seated wounds. That something is addressed by the third, and
performative, R: reconstruction.!6 1 This dimension to social healing focuses
on building a new productive relationship through apologies, forgiveness, and a
reallocation of political and economic power.16 2 It entails restructuring the
institutions (including laws) that triggered the injustice.
Encompassing more than mere payments of money, the fourth R,
reparations, also includes restitution, rehabilitation, community restructuring,
' Id. at 33.
154 For a complete discussion of what recognition entails, see YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 175-85.
'5s Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 33; YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note
24, at 175-85. See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Coping With Lasting Social Injustice, 13 WASH. &
LEE J. Civ. RTs. & Soc. JUST. 259, 273 (2007).
156 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 33.
157 See YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 184.
158 Id. at 185.
1s9 Id.
160 Id. at 189.
1" Id. at 190.
162 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 34.
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and political education. The general aim of reparations, then, is to
proactively repair the significant multi-faceted damage.' Depending on the
harms, reparations may include "the restoration of property, rebuilding of
culture, economic development, and medical, legal, or .. . financial support for
individuals and communities in need." 65
The first two Rs, recognition and responsibility, entail words, often in the
form of acknowledgments, apologies, and commitments. The latter two Rs,
reconstruction and reparations, entail actions that fulfill verbal commitments
and foster comprehensive sustained healing. When government and groups
endeavor to craft a reconciliation initiative, inquiries into recognition,
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparations illuminate the kind of justice
that is likely to foster long-term social healing.166
The Four Rs also reveal why reconciliation initiatives sometimes struggle.
Even if governments engage the first two Rs, recognition and responsibility,
action in the form of reconstruction and reparations does not always follow.
Common refrains emerge-governments plead financial incapacity or simply
fail to make acting on redress promises a priority. 67  Or, in the case of
Governor Lingle's administration, the executive may be supportive of several
aspects of reconciliation 6 8 but decide that the state's other interests take
precedence over the particular matter at hand.
163 Id. See also Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF
REPARATIONS, supra note 11, at 451, 452-53.
164 De Greiff, supra note 163, at 455. Scholars advocate reparations programs that focus on
the specific needs and desires of those harmed. See Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparation Programs, 31 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 257 (2009).
165 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 35.
166 See Bradford, supra note 23 (applying the Four Rs to Native American reparations);
Carla D. Pratt, Tribes and Tribulations: Beyond Sovereign Immunity and Toward Reparation
and Reconciliation for the Estelusti, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANc. L.J. 61 (2005)
(employing the Four Rs for assessing treatment of Black Native Americans); Rebecca Tsosie,
Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing Within Critical Race Theory: An Exercise in
Transformative Thought, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 21 (2005) (integrating Four Rs analysis into
assessments of Native American and Native Hawaiian justice) .
167 See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 29, at 3.
168 Governor Lingle's administration initially provided strong support for the congressional
Akaka Bill. The bill attempted to "establish[] a process within the framework of federal law for
Native Hawaiians to reorganize a governing body to engage in a government-to-government
relationship with the United States." Press Release, Senator Daniel Akaka, Native Hawaiian
Recognition Bill Introduced (July 20, 2000), available at http://akaka.senate.gov/press-
releases.cfm?method=releases.view&id=fa21e3d4-aa7e-4dc3-a223-9c66a7906a2d. Governor
Lingle wrote to a Republican Senator: "It is a very simple matter ofjustice and fairness that
Native Hawaiians receive the same treatment that America's other indigenous people enjoy."
Gordon Y.K. Pang, Lingle Lobbies for Akaka Bill, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 18, 2006,
available at http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/May/18/In/FP605180329.html.
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In this light, OHA v. HCDCH highlights a limited but nevertheless
significant executive recalcitrance in the reconciliation realm and underscores
the need for targeted accountability. In the big picture, it is about the Hawai'i
Supreme Court's willingness to enforce key action-oriented aspects of the
government's reconciliation commitment to ensure that reconciliation efforts
are more than words alone.
B. A Court's Limited Though Signficant Role in the Reconciliation Process
OHA v. HCDCH thus lays a foundation for reconciliation participants who
seek to preserve for ultimate political resolution the crucial aspects of a
government's and citizenry's commitments. The case demonstrates how a
court, under certain conditions, plays a limited but nevertheless integral role in
legitimizing and fostering a meaningful reconciliation process. As elaborated
below, in appropriate circumstances a court can engage in a two-step process of
first identifying a commitment to reconciliation that is embedded in law, and
then enforcing key aspects of that commitment in order to ensure that the
process proceeds productively. In these situations, the court aids reconciliation
initiatives by preventing promises of redress by the executive or legislature
from becoming dishonored commitments.
1. Political question?
At the threshold, the issue arises whether even a limited judicial role in a
reconciliation process moves a court into the realm of non-justiciable political
questions, thereby transgressing the proper separation of powers. The U.S.
Supreme Court's six-factor test for determining non-justiciable political
questions provides guidance. 16 9  The Hawai'i Supreme Court in OHA v.
Revisions to the Akaka Bill led Governor Lingle to temporarily withhold support, but after
additional revisions, the Governor reaffirmed her support. See Derrick De Pledge, Lingle Backs
Akaka Bill Changes, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER, July 8, 2010, available at
http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/20100708 Lingle backsAkakaBill changes.html.
169 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216 (1962). The Hawai'i Supreme Court adopted the
Baker six-factor test in Trustees of Office ofHawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 737
P.2d 446 (1987). The standard for a political question is the presence of one of the following
six factors: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; (3) the impossibility for deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. Id. at 455 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217) (format altered).
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HCDCH applied the test and determined that the political question doctrine did
not foreclose the plaintiffs' claims.17 0 The Hawai'i Supreme Court drew a
crucial distinction: "[T]he plaintiffs are not seeking ajudicial resolution of the
underlying claim for a return of lands, but are rather asking the judiciary to
protect the trust assets while the dispute is being resolved [(in the reconciliation
process)] by the political branches."l 7 ' The Court recognized that what type of
governance relationship is proper (i.e., the State's relationship to a forthcoming
sovereign or quasi-sovereign Hawaiian government), and what reparations are
adequate (i.e., the amount of money and land returned), are political questions
ultimately to be negotiated by the Native Hawaiian entity, the state government,
and the people of Hawai'i. A court does not participate in these political
negotiations or determine their outcome (i.e., whether Native Hawaiians are
entitled to ceded lands or to which lands they are entitled). Instead, the court in
essence acts as a legal referee to ensure that the reconciliation process proceeds
faithfully.
2. A two-step process
a. Identifying a commitment embedded in law
How does the two-step process work practically? Initially, a court assesses
whether a government has made a commitment to reconciliation. This means
identifying governmental promises grounded in law to repair the long-standing
damage of historic injustice. Words that acknowledge wrongdoing and related
harms and promise repair comprise the first two Rs: recognition and
responsibility. A court thus inquires into the existence of a reconciliation
commitment through language in the constitution and pronouncements by the
legislature and executive.
As a guiding example, the Hawai'i Supreme Court identified the State of
Hawai'i's reconciliation commitment to mutually resolve Native Hawaiian
people's claims to ceded lands in various realms of state law: the Hawai'i State
Constitution, multiple statutes, and executive pronouncements.17 2 The Court
recognized that Hawai'i's people ratified a 1978 state constitutional
amendment creating OHA.17 3 Tasked with administering ceded lands trust
170 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw. 174,
210, 177 P.3d 884,920(2008), rev'dsub nom. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct.
1436 (2009).
' Id. (internal brackets omitted).
172 The following discussion is drawn with permission from Brief for Equal Justice Society
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 39.
' OHA, 117 Haw. at 182, 177 P.3d at 892.
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resources for the betterment of Native Hawaiians,174 OHA marked a step
toward Hawaiian self-governance.' 7 1 It also represented much more. OHA
embodied the State's recognition of Native Hawaiians' loss of self-governance
and its corresponding responsibility for beginning to repair the damage of
colonization. 7 6 By supporting this new semi-autonomous government agency,
Hawai'i's citizenry embraced collective responsibility for affording Hawai'i's
indigenous peoples a measure of self-determination.
The 1978 Constitutional Convention delegates expressly recognized the
historic injustices and determined that it was "well past time" for the State to
"meet the obligation that we have to do justice" for the Native Hawaiian
people.177  Anticipating self-government and reparations as part of the
reparatory justice process, the Convention's Committee on Hawaiian Affairs
described. OHA's function as a "receptacle for any funds, land or other
resources earmarked for or belonging to native Hawaiians."' 78 OHA would be
the vehicle that "provide[d] for accountability, self-determination, [and]
methods for self-sufficiency through assets and a land base."l 79 OHA would
have "the power to accept the transfer of reparations moneys and land." 80
Equally significant, the Hawai'i Supreme Court highlighted the Legislature's
recognition of past injustices and the acceptance of responsibility for repair.' 8'
The Court acknowledged that after the adoption of the 1978 Constitutional
Amendment creating OHA, the Hawai'i Legislature enacted enabling
legislation.182 Act 196 reaffirmed the State's "solemn trust obligation and
responsibility to [N]ative Hawaiians."' 83 Envisioning future redress, as did the
174 See HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 5-6; HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-3(6) (2009).
17s See Melody K. MacKenzie, Self-Determination and Self-Governance, in NATIVE
HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, supra note 52, at 77, 89.
176 See Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1766-67 (2000) (describing the struggle over collective
memory of an injustice as a predicate to recognizing the harms and need for repair).
177 DEBATES IN COMM. OF THE WHOLE ON HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, COMM. PROPOSALNo. 13, in2
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 460 (1980)
(statement of Delegate Barr). See also id. at 457, 458 ("[T]he Hawaiians had become ... land-
less" and the creation of OHA would "address the modem-day problems of Hawaiians which
are rooted in as dark and sad a history as will ever mark the annals of time." (statement of
Delegate De Soto)).
178 STANDING Comm. REP. No. 59, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF HAWAII OF 1978, at 644 (1980).
'7 Id. at 646.
1s0 Id. at 645.
181 See Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw.
174,182, 177 P.3d 884, 892 (2008), rev'dsub nom. Hawaii v. Office ofHawaiian Affairs, 129
S. Ct. 1439 (2009).
182 See id.
183 Act of June 7, 1979, No. 196, § 2, 1979 Haw. Sess. Laws 398, 399.
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Constitutional Convention delegates, the Act expressly identified one of OHA's
primary functions as serving "as a receptacle for reparations."
Subsequent legislation embraced the language of reconciliation and
crystallized the State's commitment. Specifically, the Court pointed to Acts
354, 359, 329, and 340, 185 which acknowledged the long-standing harms to the
Hawaiian community and the State's commitment to repairing the damage.
Emphasizing the State's recognition of harms and commitment to
reconstructing relationships and repairing the damage, the Court quoted from
Act 354: "The [Hawai'i] legislature has also acknowledged that the actions by
the United States were illegal and immoral, and pledges its continued support
to the native Hawaiian community by taking steps to promote the restoration of
the rights and dignity of native Hawaiians."'16  Additionally, the Court
recognized that the Legislature in Act 359 "made findings similar to those
expressed in the Apology Resolution," 87 detailed in the Act's purpose to
"facilitate the efforts of native Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous
sovereign nation of their own choosing."' 88 Act 329 also provided the Court
with compelling evidence of the State's commitment to "permanent
reconciliation" with Native Hawaiians in order to achieve a "comprehensive,
just, and lasting resolution."'8 9 As highlighted by the Court, "[t]he legislature
recognizes that the lasting reconciliation so desired by allpeople oflawai'i is
possible only if it fairly acknowledges the past while moving into Hawaii's
future."9 0
Kaho'olawe' 9' legislation indicated that verbal commitments about
recognition and responsibility would materialize into reparatory action. Act
340 dictated that "the State shall transfer management and control of the island
and its waters to the sovereign native Hawaiian entity upon its recognition by
18 HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-3(6) (2009).
OHA, 117 Haw. at 193, 177 P.3d at 903.
186 Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 354, § 1, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999, 1000)
(emphasis added).
18 Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 359, §§ 1-2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009,1009-11).
188 Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1993, No. 359, § 2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws at 1010).
181 Id. at 194,177 P.3d at 904 (quoting Act of June 30, 1997, No. 329, § 1, 1997 Haw. Sess.
Laws 956, 956) (emphasis added).
190 Id. (quoting Act of June 30, 1997, No. 329, § 1, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws at 956) (emphasis
added).
191 Kaho'olawe is one of the eight main islands in the Hawaiian Islands. Despite the
spiritual and cultural significance of the island to Native Hawaiians, the federal government
used the island for U.S. military training operations. Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawai'i obtained
federal appropriations to repair the damage caused by the U.S. Navy's bombing. The State
created the Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission to manage the Kaho'olawe Island Reserve
while it is held in trust for a future sovereign Native Hawaiian entity. See KAHO'OLAWE ISLAND
RESERVE CoMMISsIoN, http://kahoolawe.hawaii.gov/home.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
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the United States and the State of Hawai'i.",9 2 Significantly, the legislation
referred to reconstruction of government relationships with Native Hawaiians
and to reparation in the form of land restoration.
This confluence of legislation persuaded the Court that the State made a
commitment to reconciliation with Native Hawaiians-a commitment that
encompassed future negotiations over issues of self-governance and return of
land. Commitments made by Hawai'i's executive branch further bolstered the
Court's assessments. Former Governor Lingle, in her 2003 State of the State
Address, pledged: "Here at home in Hawai'i[,] I will continue to work with
[the legislators] and with the Hawaiian community to resolve the ceded lands
issue once and for all."'9  Governor Lingle's words echoed similar
commitments made by previous governors.
As identified by the Court, the State's commitment to reconciliation is rooted
in the state constitution, detailed legislation, and executive pronouncements. In
this initial step, then, a court's role is to identify when the political branches
have made a commitment to reconcile.
b. Enforcing key aspects of the reconciliation commitment
The second step, in limited fashion, helps transform words of recognition
and responsibility into reparatory action. After identifying a commitment to
reconciliation that promises reconstruction and reparation, the court, under
certain conditions, carefully enforces key aspects of those promises in ways that
are consistent with the goal of the initiative.' 95 More specifically, the court
inquires into whether it is necessary for the government to take appropriate
action on key aspects of the reconciliation commitment in order to ensure the
process proceeds productively. Some aspects of the reconciliation process are
necessarily fluid and depend on external circumstances. But not all. The
court's role is to identify and preserve the key pieces that are integral to the
reconciliation process.
How does the court know when to intercede? Inquiry into appropriate acts of
reconstruction and reparation that transform verbal commitments into concrete
actions provides guidance.
192 OHA, 117 Haw. at 194, 177 P.3d at 904 (quoting Act of June 30, 1993, No. 340, § 2,
1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 803, 806).
1 Id. at 213, 177 P.3d at 923 (quoting Governor Linda Lingle, State of Haw., State ofthe
State Address: An Outline of the Governor's Agenda (Jan. 21, 2003)).
194 See Benjamin J. Cayetano, The Next Four Years: Completing the Vision, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Oct. 16, 1998, at A13.
195 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 7 (identifying the dual goals of reconciliation as
healing the injured and healing society).
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In OHA v. HCDCH, the Hawai'i Supreme Court determined that the State's
commitment to reconciliation included negotiation over the return of land and
some form of self-governance. 6 The Court then identified the central role that
ceded lands, now held in trust, play in the reconciliation process. 197
The reconstruction inquiry illuminates why ceded lands are integral aspects
of the reconciliation commitment. Reconstruction entails fundamental
restructuring of relationships and a reallocation of power. 9 8 Grounds exist
under international law'99 for restructuring State-Hawaiian relations, as well as
U.S.-Hawaiian relations, according to principles of self-determination.200
These principles are enshrined in a plethora of international human rights
201instruments. In particular, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 20 2 to which the United States pledged support in 2010,203
acknowledges indigenous peoples' right to self-determination.204 Under the
Declaration, indigenous peoples have the "right to autonomy or self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs"205 and the
196 See OHA, 117 Haw. at 212-14, 177 P.3d at 922-24.
' See id. at 213-17, 177 P.3d at 923-27.
198 Yamamoto & Obrey, supra note 1, at 34; YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note
24, at 190-91.
199 The Hawai'i Supreme Court "recognize[d] that international law and situations cited by
the plaintiffs provide support for their requested injunction" but reserved discussion because the
Court found adequate state and federal laws to support its holding. OHA, 117 Haw. at 211 n.25,
177 P.3d at 921 n.25.
200 See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 23, at 330-31; Elena Cirkovic, Self-Determination and
Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 375,381 (2007); Trask, supra
note 53, at 90-95; Jon M. Van Dyke, Carmen Di Amore-Siah & Gerald W. Berkley-Coats, Self-
Determination for Nonself-Governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of
Guam and Hawaii, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 623 (1996).
201 See U.N. Charter art. I para. 2, art. 55; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514 (XV), para. 2, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec.
14, 1960); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning the Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970).
202 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfli/en/
drip.html [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples].
203 Krissah Thompson, US. Will Sign UN. Declaration on Rights ofNative People, Obama
Tells Tribes, WASH. PosT, Dec. 16, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121603136.html.
204 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 202, at art. 3.
205 Id. at art. 4. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
evidences the international community's aspirations to support and protect the rights of
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"right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social,
and cultural institutions., 2 06
More concretely, as the Hawai'i Supreme Court acknowledged, Native
Hawaiians and the state and federal governments are in the process of
attempting to restructure their relationship through controversial federal
legislation commonly referred to as the "Akaka Bill." 207 The Court observed
that the purpose of the Akaka Bill "is to authorize a process for the
reorganization of a [n]ative Hawaiian government and to provide for the
recognition of [a] [njative Hawaiian government by the United States for the
purpose of carrying on a government-to-government relationship." 208  The
Court explained that the Akaka Bill "provides that the federal government is
authorized to negotiate with the State and the reorganized [n]ative Hawaiian
government for a transfer of land and resources to a [n]ative Hawaiian
government."2 0 9 The bill would formally recognize the Native Hawaiians as
indigenous people and set in motion a negotiating process for pursuing land
claims with the State.2 10 The legislation, if enacted, would therefore restructure
the relationship between the State and Native Hawaiians.2 1 1
indigenous peoples.
206 Id. at art. 5.
207 See Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw. (OHA), 117 Haw.
174, 182, 177 P.3d 884, 892 (2008), revdsub nom. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129
S. Ct. 1439 (2009). For a discussion on the Akaka Bill, see Le'a Malia Kanehe, TheAkaka Bill:
The Native Hawaiians' Race for Federal Recognition, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 857 (2001); R.
H6kilei Lindsey, Akaka Bill: Native Hawaiians, Legal Realities, and Politics as Usual, 24 U.
HAW. L. REV. 693 (2002); and VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 270-72.
208 OHA, 117 Haw. at 182 n.7, 177 P.3d at 892 n.7 (quoting S. REP. No. 107-66, at 1
(2001)).
209 Id. at 182, 177 P.3d at 892. The Akaka Bill has garnered support and opposition from
Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian groups. Proponents view the bill as part of restructuring the
relationship between Native Hawaiians and the state and federal government. Opponents claim
that the bill is merely a "racial preference" and is therefore illegal. Other opponents charge that
the bill does not reach far enough and that the U.S. Department of Interior's control over the
"self-governance" process undermines genuine self-determination. See Richard Borreca, Hopes
Dim for Akaka Bill Vote, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, July 21, 2005, available at
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2005/07/21/news/index2.html; Bruce Fein, Op-Ed., Senator
Made Several Mistakes in Conception ofRace-based Bill, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 7,
2005, available at http://archives.starbulletin.com/2005/08/07/editoriallspecial.html; Boyd P.
Mossman, Op-Ed., Hawailans Deserve Recognition Like Other Indigenous Groups, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 7, 2005, available at
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2005/08/07/editorial/special.html.
210 See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 270-72 (explaining the Akaka Bill).
211 On July 6, 2011, Governor Abercrombie signed into law Senate Bill 1520 as Act 195.
Chad Blair, 'First step'to a Native Hawaiian Governing Entity, HONOLULU CIvIL BEAT, July 6,
2011, available at http://www.civilbeat.com/articles/2011/07/06/12000-first-step-to-a-native-
hawaiian-governing-entity/. Patterned generally on the Akaka Bill, the Act aims to reconstruct
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Underscoring the importance of preserving ceded lands as a focal point for
restructuring this relationship, the Court observed that expert David H. Getches
highlighted that "what is special about these claims is that this is land that has a
pedigree tracing back to a disposition of the Hawaiian people at the time of the
overthrow."2 12 When asked whether a political entity can govern without
territory, Getches explained that "[i]t is very difficult to have sovereignty
without land."213
The Court's inquiry into Native Hawaiians' historical connection to land
revealed that ceded lands also play a fundamental role in meaningful acts of
reparation. As the Court recognized, loss of homeland contributes to Native
Hawaiians' present-day grievances. Highlighting the special relationship
between Native Hawaiians and the land, or 'lina,214 the Court's opinion
included an eloquent statement by the trial court:
'Aina is a living and vital part of the [niative Hawaiian cosmology, and is
irreplaceable. The natural elements-land, air, water, ocean-are
interconnected and interdependent. To [njative Hawaiians, land is not a
commodity; it is the foundation of their cultural and spiritual identity as
Hawaiians. The 'aina is part of their 'ohana, and they care for it as they do for
other members of their families. For them, the land and the natural environment
is alive, respected, treasured, praised, and even worshiped.215
This language underscores why the return of some portion of ceded lands to
a representative Hawaiian entity is a key aspect of the reconciliation initiative.
According to Hawaiian kilpuna, land is not merely a limited resource; it is
intimately connected to Native Hawaiians' cultural and spiritual identity as a
group.216 It is integral to their long-standing injury. Return of some portion of
the ceded lands-the original Crown and Government lands-works to repair
the damage of historical injustice. As the Court's holding acknowledged,
the State-Native Hawaiian political relationship. Act of July 6,2011, No. 195, § 1, 2011 Haw.
Sess. Laws 646, 648 ("The purpose of this Act is to recognize Native Hawaiians as the only
indigenous, aboriginal, maoli population of Hawaii. It is also the state's desire to support the
continuing development of a reorganized Native Hawaiian governing entity and, ultimately, the
federal recognition of Native Hawaiians."). With reconciliation as a primary purpose, the Act
strives to facilitate Native Hawaiian organization of a self-governing entity. Id.
212 OHA, 117 Haw. at 214, 177 P.3d at 924.
213 Id. at 214, 177 P.3d at 925.
214 Melody K. MacKenzie, Susan K. Serrano & Koalani L. Kaulukukui, Environmental
Justice for Indigenous Hawaiians: Reclaiming Land and Resources, 21 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 37, 37 (2007); see also Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing
Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLo. L. REv. 311 (2001).
215 OHA, 117 Haw. at 214, 177 P.3d at 924 (footnotes omitted in original) (some emphases
in original and some emphases removed). The trial court's statement drew upon the expert
testimony of Professor Davianna McGregor.
216 See McGREGOR, supra note 53; KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 50.
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reducing reparations to monetary payments would undermine the reconciliation
process. It would disregard the cultural and spiritual salience of the ceded
lands. Monetary reparations would not suffice as a logical remedy.
The reconstruction and reparation inquiries thus guide a court in facilitating
the transformation of redress promises into concrete actions. The Hawai'i
Supreme Court cautioned that "without an injunction, any ceded lands
alienated from the public lands trust will be lost and will not be available for
the future reconciliation efforts contemplated by ... Acts 354, 359, and 329,
and Governor Lingle." 2 1 8 Given the State's recognition of Native Hawaiians'
unrelinquished claims to ceded lands and desire for self-governance, "any
further diminishment of the ceded lands (the 'aina) from the public lands trust
will negatively impact the contemplated reconciliation/settlement efforts
between native Hawaiians and the State." 219 The Court therefore preserved that
integral part of the government's commitment to reconciliation with Native
Hawaiians.
Assessed through the lens of Social Healing Through Justice, OHA v.
HCDCH thus illuminates the two-step process for determining when the
judiciary can and should intercede, in essence, to act as a legal referee to ensure
that the reconciliation process proceeds faithfully.
3. Going forward: A state law basis for reconciliation
Going forward, key questions remain for Native Hawaiians and the State as
they endeavor to repair the "devastating" damage.220 What will be the form of
Native Hawaiian self-governance? What land will be returned? The Hawai'i
Supreme Court in OHA v. HCDCH acknowledged that its role is not to resolve
those questions.2 2 1 The answers will be negotiated through the political
process.222
The Court clearly conveyed, however, its assessment that there exists an
adequate basis in state law for the state courts to enforce key aspects of the
217 Scholars have recognized the inappropriateness and inadequacy of reducing reparations
to monetary payments. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987) (providing seminal scholarship on
reparations for Native Hawaiians); see also BROOKS, supra note 47; BROPHY, supra note 47.
218 OHA, 117 Haw. at 214, 177 P.3d at 924.
219 Id. at 216, 177 P.3d at 926.
220 See Hawaii Advisory Committee, supra note 51, at 12-18.
221 See OHA, 117 Haw. at 213, 177 P,3d at 923 ("For present purposes, this court need not
speculate as to what a future settlement might entail-i.e., whether such settlement would
involve monetary payment, transfer of lands, ceded or otherwise, a combination of money and
land, or the creation of a sovereign Hawaiian nation; it is enough that Congress, the legislature,
and the governor have all expressed their desire to reach such a settlement.").
222 See id.
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reconciliation commitment. 223 Although the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the
original Hawai'i Supreme Court decision because of its reliance on federal law,
the U.S. high court left the door open for the Hawai'i Supreme Court to
reinscribe its state law-based reconciliation analysis in future cases.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: RIPPLE EFFECTS
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's transformative decision in OHA v. HCDCH
shows that a commitment to reparatory justice may be more than rhetoric. In
some situations, it has real legal consequences with significant cultural and
institutional impacts. Implicit in the Court's holding is the notion that there are
certain aspects of a reconciliation initiative that are so fundamental to the
process that promises of action on those aspects are enforceable by courts of
law. Thus, if the political branches and affected groups engage in a struggle to
address the historic injustice and mutually commit to a process of
reconciliation, including reparatory action, then the government's commitment
embraces more than words. The commitment carries limited, but nevertheless
significant, legal obligations.224 For the State of Hawai'i, at a minimum, those
legal obligations encompass the preservation of ceded lands held in trust until
Native Hawaiian claims to those lands are politically negotiated as an integral
part of the reconciliation process.
Chief Justice Moon's OHA v. HCDCH opinion, then, illuminates one
possible way to construct a multi-faceted reconciliation initiative. If
government, organizations, and communities shape a reconciliation initiative by
identifying claims to special land or cultural resources and commit through law
to negotiate over those claims, 225 then the government (or organizations) cannot
subvert that commitment by selling or destroying the targeted land or cultural
resources before faithfully completing negotiations. If the government (or
organizations) attempts to do so, the judiciary is empowered to intercede in
limited fashion through its equitable powers226 to preserve that land or
resources throughout the reconciliation process.
223 See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
224 See supra Part IV.B.2.b.
225 Whether the special land or other resources must be the res of a formal trust, generating
traditional trustee duties, or need only be designated by policymakers to be an integral part of
the reconciliation process is a question to be resolved as it arises in concrete cases.
226 A court's equitable powers are employed to assure fairness and justice where the court's
powers at law (mainly in the form of monetary compensation) are inadequate. See Fleming v.
Napili Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 70, 430 P.2d 316, 319 (1967) ("We hold the court of equity has
plenary power to mold its decrees in such form as to conserve the equities of all parties."
(quoting Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rogers P. & H. Co., 154 So. 591, 597 (Ala. 1934))); 27A
Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 2 (2008) ("[E]quity's purpose is to promote and achieve justice and do so
with some degree of flexibility.").
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OHA v. HCDCH thus stands, if not as a beacon, then as a guiding light for
some reconciliation initiatives. The rubble-strewn roads to reconciliation in the
United States and worldwide pose many challenges, particularly where
promises to repair damages of historic injustice are followed by sluggish
reparatory action. Indeed, a common concern confronting all redress
participants is how to transform promises of repair into concrete action. Peru
and South Africa, for example, engaged reconciliation initiatives that
recognized widespread human rights violations and accepted responsibility for
remediating them. They also embraced comprehensive plans for repair. Those
initiatives, though, fell short of genuine social healing because of a lack of
comprehensive and systemic reparatory action-including economic
justice22 7-in the form of bottom-up economic development (reconstruction)
and individual payments (reparations) to those aggrieved.228 Similar "obstacles
plague reconciliation initiatives across the globe, from Sierra Leone to Chile
and from Sri Lanka to Bosnia."22 9
People suffering the persisting harms of historic injustice in Hawai'i, the
continental United States, and other countries seek, and deserve, more than
"cheap grace"-all words and no action.230 Often promised much, they
frequently receive little. But sometimes governments and the populace deliver
the kind of multi-faceted justice that heals. 2 31 Against these stark realities, the
Social Healing Through Justice framework for shaping and assessing
reconciliation initiatives illuminates the salience of Chief Justice Moon's OHA
v. HCDCH opinion and its potential ripple effects in this "Age of
Reconciliation." That opinion charts a potential collaborative path for the
people, the legislature, the executive branch, and, yes, the courts in fostering
genuine reconciliation-so that all in the polity might work together
productively and live together peacefully. We all have a stake in social healing
through justice.
227 EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER,
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 1167, 1174 (2005); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELAP. HARRIS,
WHEN MARKETS FAIL: RACE AND ECONOMICS 489-91 (2006); see also HAYNER, supra note 16;
SEN, supra note 47.
228 See Yamamoto & Mackintosh, supra note 29. See also Angel Piez, No Right
Reparations Yet for Families of Civil War Victims, INTERPRESS SERVICE (July 27, 2010),
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52284.
229 YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 2.
230 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 194-95.
231 See YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supra note 2.
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